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I. INTRODUCTION 
After 32 years of employment with the city of Lincoln Park, Michigan, 
Police Chief Robert Duncan retired.1 As a term of his employment agreement, 
Duncan received a pension of $22,620 per year and health care benefits in his 
retirement.2 But from 2002 to 2013, the funding in Lincoln Park’s pension fund 
dropped from covering 100% of its obligations to just 22% of its obligations.3 
Duncan and fellow pensioners alleged that the Lincoln Park city council and 
pension commissions “routinely ignored the audits and warnings” from state 
retirement administrators “that the system was ‘failing at a catastrophic rate.’”4 
Ultimately, the city council relinquished control of the city finances to a state-
appointed emergency manager.5  
Michigan law allowed the emergency manager to “[r]eject, modify, or 
terminate 1 or more terms and conditions of an existing contract,”6 and the 
emergency manager elected to replace the health care benefits for some Lincoln 
Park retirees with a $150 stipend.7 Despite the guarantees laid out in his 
employment agreement for over 32 years, Duncan and his wife would no longer 
receive health benefits as part of his pension or cost of living adjustments.8 As 
a result, Police Chief Duncan paid nearly $10,000 a year to replace the 
healthcare lost though years of mismanagement and the emergency manager’s 
pen stroke.9  
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 1 Jessica Strachan, Lincoln Park Retirees Sue: A Breakdown of the Lawsuit Filed to 
Reinstate Health Benefits, NEWS-HERALD (Aug. 21, 2015), 
http://www.thenewsherald.com/news/lincoln-park-retirees-sue-a-breakdown-of-the-
lawsuit-filed/article_d2d5a146-18d8-5ee5-b735-ebe6a08de083.html [https://perma. 
cc/VT6S-YB2B]. The opening vignette relates the story of one of the plaintiffs from 
Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2017), where the court held that Section 1983 
did not recognize Contract Clause-based causes of action.  
 2 Strachan, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id.  
 5 Id. 
 6 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1552(1)(j) (2018). For a discussion and analysis of 
Michigan’s laws authorizing non-elected emergency managers to be appointed, see Sydney 
L. Hawthorne, Do Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures in the Context of 
Democracy? Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law & the Voting Rights Act, 41 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 181 (2017).  
 7 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 342–43.  
 8 Verified Class Action Complaint for Damages & Request for Injunctive Relief, 
Kaminski v. Coulter, No. 2:15-cv-12810-GAD-RSW (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2015), ECF No. 
60.  
 9 Id. 
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Lincoln Park is not alone. In other Michigan cities, the emergency manager 
law has enabled emergency managers to unilaterally modify collective 
bargaining agreements, fire local government and school district employees, and 
privatize services previously provided by local governments.10 A survey found 
that 81% of Michigan residents had low or very low trust in Michigan’s 
emergency manager system.11 Most Michigan residents “interviewed in 
community conversations approv[e] of ‘more checks and balances’ and ‘shared 
decisions’ between emergency managers and local officials.”12 But despite the 
criticisms of emergency managers’ broad powers, lack of accountability, and 
circumvention of local elections, Michigan has not reined in the emergency 
manager law.13 Michigan’s emergency management system is not the only 
example of legislation that authorizes the state to rewrite or modify contractual 
obligations without compensation. In other circumstances, governments have 
enacted laws that impose extra contractual fees upon a party under contract with 
the government and revised pension benefits.14  
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no state 
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.15 Additionally, the Civil 
 
 10 Ned Resnikoff, Cash-Strapped Cities Seized by New Management, MSNBC (Mar. 
11, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/the-ed-show/cash-strapped-cities-seized-new-
management [https://perma.cc/7X69-K45L] (noting that if Detroit, Michigan enters 
emergency management, “roughly half of the state’s black population, living in primarily 
urban centers” would be supervised by leaders who were not democratically elected and that 
more than 5000 unionized municipal employees would “totally lose control” of collective 
contract bargaining).  
 11 Ted Roelofs, Michiganders Say Emergency Managers Wield Too Much Power, 
BRIDGE MAG. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.bridgemi.com/public-sector/michigan 
ders-say-emergency-managers-wield-too-much-power [https://perma.cc/T4EN-ERCP] 
(noting that the report of public dissatisfaction with Michigan’s emergency manager laws 
was made at “a time of extraordinary local and national attention focused on Flint, 
[Michigan] as it became clear that state emergency managers were largely responsible for 
decisions that led to toxic lead entering the city’s water supply” and that “[i]t was a state-
appointed manager who first approved plans to switch the source of Flint’s drinking water 
to the Flint River, without ensuring the water was properly treated”). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Jonathan Oosting, Michigan: No Emergency Managers for First Time Since ‘00, 
DETROIT NEWS (June 27, 2018), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/ 
michigan/2018/06/27/michigan-no-emergency-managers-first-time-since-2000/ 
737947002/ [https://perma.cc/UBJ8-FNL9]. In fact, June 2018 marked the first time in 
eighteen years that no Michigan city was under emergency management. Id.  
 14 See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam) (ruling on a local municipal ordinance that created additional fees chargeable to a 
utility company for work being performed under an existing contract with the municipality) 
(citing the lower court decision, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2002)); Crosby v. City of 
Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 2011) (ruling on a municipal police pension fund that 
dissolved and halted retirees’ benefits after the pension fund’s insolvency, which was caused 
at least in part by the cessation of contributions to the fund). 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make 
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Rights Act of 1871, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides equitable relief when 
constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities are violated by individuals under 
the color of law.16 Yet three federal circuit courts are split on whether or not the 
Contract Clause recognizes an individual right that can be protected through 
Section 1983 claims.17 In 2017, when the Sixth Circuit reviewed the scenario at 
the beginning of this Note, the court held that Police Chief Duncan and other 
affected pensioners were not protected by the Contract Clause when an 
unelected state official unilaterally rewrote their employment contracts.18 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon dicta from Carter v. Greenhow,19 
an 1885 Supreme Court decision that addressed Contract Clause claims under a 
predecessor to Section 1983.20 To clarify modern Section 1983 doctrine, the 
Supreme Court should directly overturn Carter and remove the confusion 
created by Carter’s legacy. 
To illuminate this issue, this Note will examine the limiting effects of failing 
to recognize Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. Further, this Note will 
propose that the Supreme Court resolve the circuit split by overturning Carter 
and formally recognizing Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims in 
accordance with the broad application of Section 1983 that the Court applied in 
Dennis v. Higgins. Specifically, Part II of this Note will briefly explore the 
history of the Contract Clause, Section 1983, and the effects of failing to 
recognize Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. Next, Part III will 
analyze Carter and explore the Supreme Court’s placement of this case in 
Section 1983 jurisprudence. Part III will also outline the reasoning of the circuit 
courts in Southern California Gas Company, Crosby, and Kaminski, which 
created the circuit split regarding the Contract Clause and Section 1983. Part IV 
proposes that Crosby, Southern California Gas Company, and Kaminski 
illustrate that Carter has proven ill-reasoned, unworkable, and inconsistent with 
 
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of 
Nobility.”) (emphasis added). 
 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
 17 Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 2017); Crosby, 635 F.3d at 634; S. 
Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 885; see also Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Schs., 
876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 2017) (declining to rule on a Contract Clause-based Section 1983 
claim because defendants waived the issue prior to appeal). 
 18 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 339 (denying Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims 
when an emergency manager unilaterally altered employment and retiree benefits under 
Michigan emergency management laws). 
 19 Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1885) (denying landowner’s contract 
claim against tax collector for refusing to accept state-issued bond coupons as payment for 
property taxes). 
 20 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 346. 
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contemporary Section 1983 doctrine, making Carter ripe for overturn. Finally, 
Part V concludes that the Court would protect a textual constitutional right and 
reconcile Contract Clause rights with contemporary Section 1983 doctrine with 
the overturn of Carter.  
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, 
SECTION 1983, AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT CONTRACT 
CLAUSE TREATMENT 
On its face, the Contract Clause was intended to broadly protect contractual 
rights in public and private agreements.21 And Section 1983 was created as a 
vehicle to protect and vindicate federal rights against infringement.22 Yet, the 
Contract Clause has not been uniformly recognized as a valid basis for a 
Section 1983 claim, leading to limited means for individuals to hold state actors 
accountable for impairing their rights.23 This Part will explore the histories of 
the Contract Clause and Section 1983 claims before discussing the 
shortcomings of the current Contract Clause jurisprudence. 
A. The Contract Clause over Time 
The security of property rights was a primary concern of the Founding 
Fathers during the period when the U.S. Constitution was drafted.24 During the 
Constitutional Convention, participants debated the scope of protections 
necessary to prevent legislatures from infringing on the rights of contractual 
parties.25 Participants settled on the language of the Contract Clause that no state 
law shall “impair the obligations of contracts.”26 Though there is evidence that 
 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 22 See Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 349 (Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim rejected); 
Crosby, 635 F.3d at 645 (Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim rejected); and S. Cal. 
Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 898 (Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim allowed) (citing the 
lower court decision, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2002)); see also Elliott, 876 F.3d at 
926 (bypassing a ruling on a Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim because defendants 
waived the issue prior to appeal). 
 23 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see also Martin A. Schwartz & George C. Pratt, 
Section 1983, 9 TOURO L. REV. 3, 36 n.241 (1992) (citing Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 
443 (1991)) (noting legislative history of Section 1983 provides guidance that the statute is 
“remedial” and should be “liberally interpreted”). 
 24 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11–
12 (2016) (noting that the Framers had already expressly protected contractual rights in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and that the Contract Clause mirrored the Ordinance).  
 25 Id. at 12–13 (noting that Rufus King first moved to include contractual protections 
that mirrored the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, but that Gouverneur Morris and George 
Mason resisted the idea because of concerns on limiting legislatures’ power to act and 
because they thought judicial checks on legislative actions would be sufficient). 
 26 Id. at 13. 
6 THE CASE FOR OVERTURNING CARTER [Vol. 80  
the Convention committee intended to extend a level of protection to contracts 
that approximated protection against ex post facto laws in criminal matters, the 
full extent of the Contract Clause’s purpose and the Framers’ intent is not 
explicit.27  
During ratification, Federalist commentators viewed the Contract Clause 
variously as an assurance that contractual parties would have certainty in their 
agreements, a bar to debt-relief legislation, and a guardrail for “personal security 
and private rights.”28 Even Anti-Federalists endorsed the protections offered by 
the Contract Clause.29 Early court cases seemed to embrace a broad view of the 
Contract Clause’s protections.30 This view was consistent with the 
understanding of the Contract Clause at the time of ratification.31 By the time of 
the Civil War, the Contract Clause was widely litigated, serving as both a 
protector of contractual rights in public and private agreements and the primary 
vehicle for judicial review of legislation.32  
However, in the aftermath of the Civil War, state police powers and the 
emergence of due process jurisprudence weakened the application and 
 
 27 Id. (explaining that John Dickinson reportedly relied upon William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Law of England to determine that ex post facto law protections would 
not apply to civil, contractual matters). The writing committee was comprised of Alexander 
Hamilton, William S. Johnson, Rufus King, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris, but 
historians have not yet identified the author of the Contract Clause. Id.  
 28 See id. at 15–16; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[L]aws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first 
principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.”); Michael B. 
Rappaport, Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 918, 932 
(1984) (“Believing that government should promote the general welfare, rather than the 
welfare of a particular group, the Framers included the contract clause to prevent the majority 
of debtors from abusing the creditor minority.” (footnote omitted)). 
 29 ELY, supra note 24, at 17 (observing some Anti-Federalists offered even stronger 
proposals and were more concerned with enforcement of the prohibition by state courts 
versus federal courts, than the prohibition itself). 
 30 Id. at 22–24 (recounting Champion and Dickason v. Casey (1792), where the U.S. 
Circuit Court for Rhode Island blocked the application of a law to a preexisting contract 
because it would “impair the Obligation of the Contract in question” and Chisholm v. 
Georgia (1793), where the Supreme Court applied the Contract Clause to a state contract); 
see also Craig R. Shagin, Recent Developments, Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 
438 U.S. 234 (1978), 25 VILL. L. REV. 160, 162–63 (1979) (noting that in the early nineteenth 
century, the Supreme Court held that the Contract Clause applied to both “contracts to which 
the state is a party, as well as to private contracts”). 
 31 See Rappaport, supra note 28, at 923–24, 924 n.24 (“An absolute reading of the 
clause does not cripple the powers of government for which the Framers provided. Although 
the clause is not limited by a balancing requirement . . . [t]he clause applies only to action 
by the states . . . and to retroactive but not prospective impairment.”). 
 32 See ELY, supra note 24, at 103–05 (discussing the rise of the Contract Clause in 
prominence, exceptions to the broadly-applied doctrine, and the relative lack of hardship of 
the strict application of the Contract Clause prior to the Civil War). 
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importance of the Contract Clause as a protective guarantee.33 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell in 1934 
seemed to mark the practical end of the Contract Clause as a broad prohibition 
against legislative actions impairing contractual rights.34 Yet, in 1977, the 
United States Trust Court reaffirmed that the Contract Clause still functioned as 
a check on governmental police powers.35 In the decision, the Court articulated 
a Contract Clause test that applied to impairments of both private and public 
contracts.36 Shortly after, the Court clarified that as a threshold matter, a law 
must act as “substantial impairment of a contractual relationship” before 
potentially violating the Contract Clause.37  
Modern Contract Clause jurisprudence summarizes Contract Clause 
analysis as a two-step test.38 First, has the state law “‘operated as a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship?”39 And second, was the law in 
question “drawn in an ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way to advance ‘a 
 
 33 Id. at 190–91 (observing that by the 1890s, litigation strategies generally shifted to 
include due process claims with Contract Clause claims and that the strength of the Contract 
Clause in jurisprudence significantly waned). 
 34 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934); see also Jordan 
Bleznick, Case Comment, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 198 (1978) 
(quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438) (noting that the Court held that “legislative alteration of 
the private contract did not violate the contract clause” if a statute “addressed . . . a legitimate 
end and the measure taken [was] reasonable and appropriate to that end”).  
 35 U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (holding that a New Jersey law 
violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution by unreasonably and 
unnecessarily eliminating a purely financial obligation); id. (“Both of these [modern] cases 
eschewed a rigid application of the Contract Clause to invalidate state legislation. Yet neither 
[of the decisions] indicated that the Contract Clause was without meaning in modern 
constitutional jurisprudence, or that its limitation on state power was illusory. Whether or 
not the protection of contract rights comports with current views of wise public policy, the 
Contract Clause remains a part of our written Constitution.”). 
 36 Id. at 29–31; see also Bleznick, supra note 34, at 203 (summarizing that the United 
States Trust Court held that “[i]mpairments of both private and state contractual obligations 
must be both reasonable and necessary; that is, the legislation must be (1) addressed to 
changed circumstances unforeseeable at the time the contract was formed—the 
reasonableness requirement; and (2) the least restrictive means of accomplishing an 
important state purpose—the necessity requirement” (footnotes omitted)).  
 37 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978) (holding that 
legislation imposing additional burdens on a private company’s pension program violated 
the Contract Clause); id. at 245 (“The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations 
can be measured by the factors that reflect the high value the Framers placed on the 
protection of private contracts. Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and 
business affairs according to their particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights 
and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely on them.”). 
 38 Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821–22 (2018) (also noting that whether a 
substantial impairment of a contractual right exists depends on the extent of the impairment, 
interference with the parties’ reasonable expectations, and whether the law in question 
“prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights”). 
 39 Id. (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 244). 
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significant and legitimate public purpose?’”40 Some scholars have concluded 
that the Contract Clause embodies an individual right.41 Despite these recent 
reminders that the Contract Clause remains a part of the Constitution and the 
articulation of a standard that reconciles Contract Clause protections with state 
police powers, Contract Clause jurisprudence has yet to uniformly recognize the 
right of an individual to bring Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims.42  
B. Section 1983 Causes of Action 
The statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) protects individuals when 
public officials violate constitutional rights by providing a mechanism that 
allows the individuals to bring suit against the official and by encouraging 
individuals to vindicate their rights through features such as recovery of legal 
costs for the action.43 Section 1983 was enacted during the Reconstruction 
period to protect individuals from discrimination and was not widely utilized to 
bring claims against state officials until the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe 
v. Pape in 1961.44 Legislative history suggests that Section 1983 should be 
broadly construed.45 Section 1983 provides protections against the “deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”46 
 
 40 Id. (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–
12 (1983)). 
 41 See Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 23, at 36–37 (“In addition, the Contract Clause is a 
clause which gives, in no uncertain terms, a right to an individual to be free of governmental 
impairment of contracts.”). 
 42 See Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 2017) (Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claim rejected); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 645 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim rejected); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 
336 F.3d 885, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim 
allowed). 
 43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see also Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 23, at 36 n.241 
(citing Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991)) (noting legislative history of 
Section 1983 provides guidance that the statute is “remedial” and should be “liberally 
interpreted”); Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties under 
Section 1983?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 9, 13–14 (2004) (noting that Section 1983 actions allow 
procedural advantages to plaintiffs such as the availability of attorney’s fees; federal court 
jurisdiction; sometimes longer statutes of limitations; a possibility of punitive damages, as 
well as substantive advantages such as avoiding liability limitations and immunities granted 
under state laws).  
 44 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1 
(3d ed. 2014). 
 45 See Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 23, at 36 n.241 (citing Dennis, 498 U.S. at 443) 
(“[L]egislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 indicates that it is a remedial statute which should 
be liberally interpreted.”).  
 46 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105, 107 (1989) 
(holding that the Supremacy Clause could not form a valid basis for a Section 1983 claim 
because the Supremacy Clause “secures federal rights by according them priority whenever 
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Not every “right” forms a valid basis for a Section 1983 action, though.47 Courts 
have applied a two-prong test to determine whether a deprivation of rights, 
privileges, or immunities can form the basis of a Section 1983 claim.48 First, the 
court examines whether the federal provision in question “creates obligations 
binding on the governmental unit or rather ‘does no more than express a 
congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment,’” and whether such an 
interest is “‘too vague and amorphous’ [as] to be ‘beyond the competence of the 
judiciary to enforce.’”49 Second, the court considers whether “Congress 
‘specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 by providing a ‘comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism for protection of a federal right.’”50 Generally, 
Section 1983 is construed broadly.51 Within the U.S. Constitution, the First 
Amendment, Second Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Commerce Clause have been constructed to grant 
rights, privileges, and immunities that form valid sources of rights for 
Section 1983 claims.52  
C. Consequences of the Contract Clause Exclusion 
The failure to uniformly recognize Contract Clause-based Section 1983 
claims denies potential plaintiffs the benefits unique to Section 1983. This 
denial means that potential plaintiffs are less likely to bring actions to protect 
their rights.53 The chilling effect occurs because plaintiffs are not able to recover 
their litigation costs, may have to exhaust all possible state and administrative 
remedies, and may not be able to seek immediate injunctive relief through a 
Contract Clause claim alone.54 Additionally, potential plaintiffs are denied the 
opportunity to automatically bring their claims in federal court, diminishing the 
 
they come in conflict with state law,” but is not itself the source of any individual federal 
right). 
 47 Id. at 106. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 105 (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); see also Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Dennis, v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991). 
 52 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 29–30.  
 53 Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 8, 
2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/12/08/ 
294479/making-justice-equal/ [https://perma.cc/MGQ3-H8ED] (noting that the high 
costs of litigation deter even high-wealth individuals from pursuing civil actions). 
 54 James P. McMahon, Section 1983 Causes of Action Under the Contracts Clause of 
the Constitution, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 467, 474–76 (2014) (listing litigation advantages 
of pursuing actions to protect constitutional rights through Section 1983 claims). 
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chances that they may seek to protect their rights at all.55 These costs are 
particularly limiting to the financially disadvantaged and minorities.56 
Potential solutions for plaintiffs through contract law alone are insufficient 
to protect individual interests in cases where the individual is a party to a 
contract with the state. First, state contract law does not address the underlying 
constitutional protections of the Contract Clause.57 When state officials act 
under the color of state law and violate an individual’s constitutional right, any 
related breach of contract is a second and different issue than the violation of 
the individual’s constitutional right. In Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of 
Chicago, Judge Posner illustrated an example of a situation like this.58 Judge 
Posner hypothesized: 
 
We must consider, however, the bearing of [a] clause in the offer that 
entitles [a municipality] to withdraw [from the contract] if a [state] 
legislative body prevents [the municipality] from honoring the contract. 
This is a force majeure clause, excusing nonperformance under stated 
conditions. If the State of Illinois passed a law forbidding the City of 
Chicago to sell land for redevelopment, the clause would kick in, the City 
would be off the hook, and [the buyer], its contractual remedy extinguished 
by the effect of the state statute operating through the force majeure clause, 
 
 55 Id. at 47576 (noting that federal jurisdiction is more advantageous to plaintiffs 
because federal judges are more familiar with Section 1983 claims and potential bias in state 
and local courts may not be detached from the state law impairing contractual rights). 
 56 See Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 53 (reporting that at least one party in the majority 
of civil cases filed in the United States lacks representation and that “[o]n the civil side, 
people of color, women, immigrants, the elderly, people with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender, or LGBT, people are more likely to live in poverty and more likely 
to need legal assistance.” (footnotes omitted)). But see SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 21, 210 
n.151 (noting that many Section 1983 claims are brought pro se by prisoners and that the 
vast majority of such pro se claims are dismissed by the courts). So even Section 1983 causes 
of action do not eliminate all disparities amongst the poor or minorities in the vindication of 
constitutional rights. See id.  
 57 See Thomas McDonell, Comment, Reevaluating the Seventh Circuit’s Approach to 
Contract Clause Claims in an Age of Pension Reform, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 659, 671 (2014) 
(observing that “courts in ordinary breach of contract suits (nonconstitutional claims) are 
hesitant to mandate specific performance, and breach of contract damages themselves are 
subject to certain defenses”). 
 58 Horowitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1996). In 
Horwitz-Matthews, Inc., a real estate developer purchased real property from the City of 
Chicago for redevelopment in accordance with the City’s development plan. Id. at 1249. The 
real estate contract included a clause that allowed the City of Chicago to terminate the sale 
before transfer of the title if the City was enjoined or prevented from completing the sale by 
a legislative act or an executive order. Id. The City of Chicago initially approved the sale 
through an ordinance, but later passed a second ordinance that repealed the first. Id. at 1249–
50. The developer sued the City of Chicago for violating the Contract Clause. Id. The 
Seventh Circuit found that a mere breach of contract had been committed and that the City 
of Chicago did not violate the Contract Clause. Id. at 1250–52.  
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would have a good [Contract Clause] claim against the State for having 
impaired the obligation of the developer's contract.59 
 
Second, the state retains unequal bargaining power in public contracts 
because the state legislature defines the state law governing those contracts. This 
differential is greatly exacerbated when the state acts within state laws created 
for dealing with emergencies by unilaterally changing contractual rights.60 The 
state is an interested party in agreements that legislation has been used to 
unilaterally change. This creates the greatest potential for states and state 
officials to act in ways that violate the Contract Clause rights of individuals in 
public contracts.61 A check other than state contract law must be available to 
protect these individuals.62 
Finally, other sources of rights, such as the Due Process Clause, do not form 
a sufficient basis for protecting individuals’ rights in contract with the state. 
State law defines contractual rights and remedies.63 Moreover, because a 
constitutional right is at stake, a constitutional cause of action is most 
appropriate.64 Without a constitutional cause of action, those who enter into 
public agreements and contracts are uniquely vulnerable and subject to high 
penalties in the name of the public good, but are left without any individual 
recourse. Plaintiffs are left without an effective mechanism to enforce a 
constitutional guarantee because their contract rights are not necessarily 
recognized in state law, and courts are split on the validity of Contract Clause-
based Section 1983 claims. 
 
 59 Id. at 1251 (internal citations omitted).  
 60 Imagine a football game where one of the teams also made the rules, gave itself the 
power to change the rules after the game had begun, and then also created the rules governing 
any protest of those changes.  
 61 See McDonell, supra note 57, at 670 (“Contract Clause claims can actually enhance 
the meaning of a contract between the state and its citizens; the terms of a contract take on 
more significance when the state cannot unilaterally alter the agreement—and do so with 
immunity from constitutional violation.”). 
 62 Id. at 671 (discussing Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago and noting that the 
City of Chicago successfully argued a defense that breach of contract was unavoidable and 
that the City could not “be held liable for a breach of contract when . . . insufficient funds 
exist to fulfill a contractual obligation”).  
 63 See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347–49 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
an emergency manager’s unilateral revocation of retiree benefits did not violate due process 
rights because all, and not specific, retirees of the municipality were affected by the decision 
and holding that a Takings Clause claim was not ripe because state contractual remedies 
were not first exhausted). 
 64 See McDonell, supra note 57, at 675 (“Crucially, unilateral modification of public 
sector bargaining agreements by a state legislature generally implicates constitutional issues, 
as opposed to contractual or statutory issues.”). 
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III. THE SPLIT EMERGES IN CONTEMPORARY CASES: THE CIRCUIT 
COURTS’ RELIANCE ON CARTER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO., 
CROSBY, AND KAMINSKI 
Circuit courts are split on whether or not the Contract Clause represents an 
individual right that can be protected through Section 1983 claims.65 This Part 
will explore the Carter decision and Supreme Court cases applying Carter. 
Then, this Part will examine how the courts interpreted Carter and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence to either deny or recognize Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claims, creating the circuit split.  
A. Carter: An Enduring Legacy 
Decided in 1885 among the Virginia Coupon Cases, Carter v. Greenhow 
held that a taxpayer did not state a cognizable cause of action under the Civil 
Rights Act when a Virginia tax collector refused bond interest coupons as 
payment for taxes after the state law changed and disallowed the form of 
payment.66 Importantly, it must be noted, as the Court did, that Carter did not 
plead a Contract Clause rights violation.67 The Court opined that Contract 
Clause rights are conferred “only indirectly and incidentally,” but noted that 
individuals whose rights are impaired by legislation are entitled to file suit and 
have such laws declared “null.”68 Subsequently, Carter has been interpreted by 
some courts to bar Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims, and by others to 
limit the claims to instances where citizens have been denied the opportunity to 
adjudicate claims that their contractual rights were impaired.69 But the Supreme 
Court has already provided guidance on Carter and the context in which it 
should be viewed for Section 1983 claims, which forecloses these 
interpretations. 
In the landmark decision Dennis v. Higgins, the Supreme Court recognized 
Commerce Clause-based Section 1983 claims, observing that the Commerce 
 
 65 See, e.g., Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 339 (no individual constitutional right under the 
Contract Clause that can be enforced through Section 1983); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 
F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2011) (no Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. 
City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (allowing Contract Clause-
based Section 1983 claim).  
 66 Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885). For a brief discussion of the history and 
context of the Virginia Coupon Cases, see ELY, supra note 24, at 182–84. 
 67 Carter, 114 U.S. at 322 (“But of this [Contract Clause right] the plaintiff does not 
show that he has been deprived. He has simply chosen not to resort to it.”). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 347 (“[A]n alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise 
to a cause of action under § 1983.”); Crosby, 635 F.3d at 640–41, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 823 
(2011) (“[T]he Contracts Clause is limited to the discrete instances where a state has denied 
a citizen the opportunity to seek adjudication through the courts as to whether a constitutional 
impairment of a contract has occurred, or has foreclosed the imposition of an adequate 
remedy for an established impairment.”).  
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Clause was not merely a prohibition on the state’s power, but the source of 
individual rights.70 The Court rejected the characterization of the Commerce 
Clause as an analogy to the Supremacy Clause, which does not confer individual 
rights, but resolves conflicts between federal and state laws.71 While this case 
did not directly touch on Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims, the Court 
provided important context for understanding Carter in Section 1983 
jurisprudence. 
Noting that the Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 was intended to 
provide relief for infringements of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws,” the Dennis Court noted that the rights included 
within Section 1983’s scope must be “broadly” and “liberally and beneficently 
construed” to achieve Congress’s intent for the legislation.72 Furthermore, the 
Court rejected distinctions between different types of constitutional rights, 
privileges, and immunities protected under Section 1983.73 The Dennis Court 
also applied the “right” framework from Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los 
Angeles, analyzing the Commerce Clause under the considerations set forth in 
that case to determine whether or not a federal statute conferred rights to 
individuals.74 Under this test, a court should consider three factors to determine 
if a federal statute confers a right: (1) whether the statute “creates obligations 
binding on the governmental unit” or just expresses a legislative preference for 
particular treatment; (2) whether the interest that the plaintiff asserts is “too 
vague and amorphous” and beyond the judiciary’s competence to enforce; and 
(3) whether statute was “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff.”75 The Dennis 
Court found that these three factors counseled for individual rights under the 
Commerce Clause, rejecting the assertion that the Commerce Clause was not 
intended to benefit individuals.76  
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, invoked the Contract Clause as an analogy 
to the Commerce Clause under Section 1983.77 Justice Kennedy proposed that 
the Contract Clause created an individual right, which could be adjudicated 
under Section 1983, more than any individual right that could be said to exist 
under the Commerce Clause.78 The Dennis Court responded to Justice Kennedy 
 
 70 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991) (“[T]he Commerce Clause of its own 
force imposes limitations on state regulation of commerce and is the source of a right of 
action in those injured by regulations that exceed such limitations.”) (resolving a circuit split 
by recognizing Commerce Clause-based Section 1983 claims and allowing the plaintiff to 
collect legal fees after a state imposed certain taxes exclusively on trailers registered outside 
of the state). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 443. 
 73 Id. at 446–47.  
 74 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). 
 75 Dennis, 498 U.S. at 447.  
 76 Id. at 449–50.  
 77 Id. at 451–58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 78 Id. at 458 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the Contracts Clause, an express limitation 
upon States’ ability to impair the contractual rights of citizens, does not secure rights within 
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by noting that Carter is a narrow holding in which a contract cause of action 
was pleaded, not a decision regarding the validity of a Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claim.79 This was, in fact, not the first occasion that the Supreme 
Court noted that Carter’s holding was narrow and regarded a contract claim and 
not a Section 1983 claim.80  
B. Initial Recognition of Contract Clause-Based Section 1983 Claims 
In the wake of Dennis, the Ninth Circuit recognized Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claims when it held in Southern California Gas Co. v. City of 
Santa Ana that a municipality’s ordinance violated a utility provider’s Contract 
Clause rights.81 The City of Santa Ana adopted an ordinance assigning the 
Southern California Gas Company rights to build and maintain gas pipes under 
the city in exchange for a percentage of the revenue that the company generated 
through its utility service in 1938.82 In 2001, the City of Santa Ana adopted a 
new ordinance which required payments from any party “wishing to perform 
excavations or trench cuts.”83 Southern California Gas Company sued the City 
of Santa Ana, asserting in part that the city ordinance substantially impaired the 
company’s rights under the 1938 agreement in violation of the Contract 
Clause.84  
The trial court granted summary judgment to the company, recognizing a 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim and holding that the City of Santa 
Ana’s ordinance substantially impaired the company’s rights under the 1938 
agreement.85 The court in fact took for granted that Section 1983 jurisprudence 
accepted the Contract Clause as a basis for a Section 1983 claim because the 
opinion is devoid of any reference to Carter or Dennis.86 The court noted that 
“[though] written in absolute terms, the Supreme Court narrowly construes the 
Contract Clause to ensure that local governments can effectively exercise their 
 
the meaning of § 1983, it assuredly demands a great leap for the majority to conclude that 
the Commerce Clause secures the rights of persons. The Commerce Clause is, if anything, a 
less obvious source of rights for purposes of § 1983, as its text only implies a limitation upon 
state power.”). 
 79 Id. at 451 n.9 (“[Carter] held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action 
set up in the plaintiff’s pleading was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the 
‘right secured to him by that clause of the Constitution’ [the contract clause], to which he 
had ‘chosen not to resort.’”) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 
600, 613 n.29 (1979)). 
 80 See, e.g., Chapman, 441 U.S. at 613 n.29; Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 
496, 527 (1939). 
 81 S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887−98 (9th Cir. 2003) (per 
curiam). 
 82 Id. at 887. 
 83 Id. at 888. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 887–98.  
 86 Id.  
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police powers.”87 The court expounded that although local governments must 
possess sufficiently broad powers that do no implicate private contract rights,88 
“‘[a] higher level of scrutiny is required’ when the legislative interference 
involves a public rather than a private obligation.”89 The trial court’s opinion 
highlights the tension that exists between ensuring that a legislature is free to 
act to address the public good without the ability to wipe away public 
contractual obligations.  
In reaching its conclusion, the district court applied federal law to determine 
if the 1938 agreement was a contract for the purpose of the Contract Clause.90 
Finding that the agreement was a contract under the Contract Clause, the court 
applied a scrutiny test under which the ordinance could survive if the 
impairment was “‘both reasonable and necessary to fulfill an important public 
purpose,’ such that the impairment [was] justifiable.”91 Such a test addresses the 
concern that a government must be free to address the public good, while 
protecting private rights in public contracts. 
Under the scrutiny analysis, the court found that the ordinance substantially 
impaired the 1938 agreement because the ordinance imposed an additional 
financial burden on the company and impaired the company’s right to install 
and maintain gas lines under Santa Ana.92 Consequently, the court analyzed 
whether such an impairment was reasonable and necessary to an important 
public purpose.93 The court noted that whether the ordinance was reasonable or 
unreasonable hinged on whether the impairment was solving a problem which 
“existed at the time of the contractual obligation.”94 Because Santa Ana 
admitted that the harms addressed by the ordinance were “explicitly anticipated 
in 1938,” the ordinance was an attempt to charge the company for problems 
known at the time of the making of the contract.95 Thus, the ordinance was 
unreasonable and could not justify the substantial impairment of the original 
agreement.96  
Further, the court noted that the ordinance was not necessary because as an 
alternative to “imposing additional financial burdens on a private party, obvious 
more moderate alternatives” existed, including the options to raise taxes or 
 
 87 S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 889.  
 88 Id. (first quoting U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); and then quoting 
Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 889–90 (quoting Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1106). 
 92 Id. at 890–94. 
 93 S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 894 (citing lower court decision, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1129 
(C.D. Cal. 2002)).  
 94 Id. at 895 (quoting Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1107). This contract impairment analysis 
originates in U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). 
 95 S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 896 (citing lower court decision, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1129 
(C.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 96 Id.  
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impose budget restrictions.97 “If Santa Ana’s recognition of higher costs alone 
sufficed, few if any contracts with government entities would be safe from 
impairment.”98 This conclusion poignantly strikes at the heart of the problem 
with disallowing Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims—without a legal 
mechanism to protect private rights in public contracts, governments may 
essentially legislate their way out of public obligations, undermining contractual 
rights and creating an unchecked risk for any party in contract with the 
government that the government may simply change the bargain at any time.  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling and found Santa Ana’s claim that Section 1983 provided “no relief for a 
party deprived of its rights under the Contracts Clause . . . without merit.”99 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that, under Dennis, Section 1983 rights were to be liberally 
and beneficially construed.100 In holding that the Contract Clause gives 
individuals a right not to have their contractual obligations impaired by the state, 
the court observed that Section 1983 allows a Contract Clause-based cause of 
action. Further, the court noted that Carter has been narrowed by the Supreme 
Court and did not eliminate Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims because 
Carter’s observations regarding the Contract Clause were dicta.101 
In this decision, the Ninth Circuit presents a balanced approach to protecting 
both the government’s ability to make necessary laws to address the public good 
and the interests and rights of parties in contract with the state. But more 
importantly, the court properly placed the Carter decision in the pantheon of 
Contract Clause law, properly characterizing Carter as a limited decision and 
one which was not made on the merits of an actual Contract Clause-based claim. 
This decision brings the Contract Clause in balance with modern Section 1983 
jurisprudence which the Supreme Court held should be “liberally and 
beneficially construed.”102  
C. Subsequent Rejection of Contract Clause-Based Section 1983 Claims 
Not all courts have interpreted Dennis to stand for the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that Section 1983 protects Contract Clause rights as the Ninth 
Circuit did in Southern California Gas Co.103 Recent cases from the Fourth and 
 
 97 Id. at 897. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. at 886 (per curiam). 
 100 Id. at 887 (citing Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991)).  
 101 S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 887 (quoting Dennis, 498 U.S. at 451 n.9) (“Carter can 
only be read to have ‘held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in 
the plaintiff’s pleading was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the right secured 
to him by that clause of the Constitution [the contract clause], to which he had chosen not to 
resort.’”). 
 102 Id. (citing Dennis, 498 U.S. at 443). 
 103 Compare id. (recognizing Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims), with 
Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting Contract Clause-based 
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Sixth Circuits demonstrate the misconception that Carter stands for the 
proposition that Contract Clause claims are not cognizable under 
Section 1983.104 This inconsistency has helped form the jumbled jurisprudence 
that exists today.  
In 1955, the North Carolina General Assembly created the Gastonia 
Policemen's Supplemental Pension Fund through legislation.105 Decades later, 
the pension fund began experiencing financial difficulties, and an audit of the 
fund revealed that it was on a path to failure without additional funding.106 After 
the funding efforts appeared to be in vain, active police officers were allowed to 
remove their contributions to the fund, and the pension fund became 
insolvent.107 Retired police officers, who had bargained for and contributed to 
the supplemental pension, were left without any further payments from the 
pension.108 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the retirees’ 
claims.109 
The Fourth Circuit held that the retirees could not articulate a Contract 
Clause-based Section 1983 claim because Carter v. Greenhow limited such 
claims to “discrete instances where a state has denied a citizen the opportunity 
to seek adjudication through the courts as to whether a constitutional impairment 
of a contract has occurred, or has foreclosed . . . an adequate remedy . . . .”110 
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s discussion of Carter in Dennis v. 
Higgins did not serve to limit Carter, but merely served as a discussion of the 
proper analysis of Section 1983 claims.111 Since no federal rights of the retirees 
were implicated by the city’s actions regarding the pension plan, there was no 
 
Section 1983 claims), and Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 640–41, cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 823 (2011) (same). 
 104 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 347 (finding no individual constitutional right under the 
Contract Clause that can be enforced through Section 1983); Crosby, 635 F.3d at 641 (no 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim). 
 105 Crosby, 635 F.3d at 636 (noting that each retired policeman was to receive pension 
payments “monthly for the remainder of his life from the [Fund], so long as funds are 
available, an amount equal to two percent for each five years of service, or major portion 
thereof, not to exceed fourteen per cent of his average monthly salary for the three highest 
salaried years while employed by [the Department]”). 
 106 Id. at 637. 
 107 Id. at 636–39. 
 108 Id. Gastonia’s police pension promises were extended to officers until shortly before 
the fund’s insolvency in 2002. See id. at 636–37 (noting that “[i]n 1989, the City issued a 
pamphlet . . . for a time to potential police officers, not[ing] simply that ‘[t]he Gastonia 
Police Department also has a supplemental pension fund which pays 2% for every five years 
of service,’” and that “in 2001, the Police Department created a website that, for at least a 
while, contained a statement that ‘[t]he Police Department also has a supplemental pension 
fund for police officers’”). 
 109 Id. at 634. 
 110 Id. at 640; see also Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 317 (1885). 
 111 Crosby, 635 F.3d at 640–41 (“Carter was intended to address the usefulness of that 
case in providing a framework for the analysis of § 1983 claims invoking parts of the 
Constitution other than the Contracts Clause . . . .”). 
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ground to sustain the retirees’ Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims, and 
the court affirmed summary judgment for a lack of federal jurisdiction on the 
remaining state law claim.112  
Most recently, in Kaminski v. Coulter, the Sixth Circuit also held that 
Contract Clause-based claims were not allowed under Section 1983.113 After 
Lincoln Park, Michigan was placed under the administration of an emergency 
manager due to a fiscal crisis, the emergency manager issued orders that stripped 
retired Lincoln Park municipal employees of healthcare benefits.114 When some 
retirees challenged the emergency manager’s actions, the trial court allowed the 
case to proceed despite government officials’ invocation of immunity 
defenses.115 The Sixth Circuit reviewed an appeal of the lower court’s denial of 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.116 
Before reviewing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims in regards to the motion 
to dismiss, the Sixth Circuit examined whether Section 1983 allowed Contract 
Clause-based causes of action.117 To determine the answer to this question, the 
court reviewed the history of the Contract Clause, noting that Section 1983 
descended from the “substantially identical” Revised Statute 1979.118 Revised 
Statute 1979 was the product of efforts to revise and consolidate federal law 
including the Civil Rights Act of 1871.119 Eventually, Revised Statute 1979 was 
recodified as Section 1983.120 The court noted that while Section 1983 was 
transformed into “a powerful tool for checking abuses by state officials” in the 
mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court “has never definitively held that an 
alleged Contracts Clause violation is cognizable as a [Section] 1983 claim.”121  
Judge Moore, in her dissent to the Kaminski decision, attacked the court’s 
characterization of Carter and its reliance on the decision from 1885.122 Judge 
Moore noted that the Supreme Court has clearly instructed courts to liberally 
construe Section 1983 based on congressional intent for the statute.123 
Moreover, Judge Moore observed that the Carter Court did not have a Contract 
Clause-based claim before it; instead the Carter Court noted that “a complaint 
that failed even to allege a violation of the contracts clause could not give rise” 
to a cause of action under Revised Statute 1979.124 In Dennis, the dissent also 
relied upon Carter as a preclusion of Commerce Clause-based Section 1983 
 
 112 Id. at 644.  
 113 Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 114 Id. at 341 (retirees’ healthcare benefits were temporarily replaced with monthly 
stipends). 
 115 Id. at 343. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 345. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 345.  
 120 Id. at 345 n.3. 
 121 Id. at 346.  
 122 Id. at 349–51 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 123 Id. at 349. 
 124 Id. at 350. 
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claims, but the Dennis decision rejected such arguments and noted that the 
plaintiff had not pleaded a Contract Clause-based claim.125 Finally, Judge 
Moore noted that the Kaminski decision was at odds with a previous Sixth 
Circuit ruling in Welch v. Brown, where the court had affirmed a preliminary 
injunction in a Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim.126 
The Kaminski decision reflects the ambiguity that Dennis has left behind. 
Although Dennis provided a framework to determine which rights should be 
protected by Section 1983, the very nature of its Commerce Clause ruling leaves 
Carter, whatever its precedential value, on the table. Dennis clearly indicates a 
broad construction of Section 1983 to fulfill Congress’s intent of protecting 
rights like those which may be derived from the Contract Clause. In reaching 
their decisions, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits stumbled by holding Carter as 
precedent despite the clear context that the Supreme Court has repeated 
throughout recent Section 1983 jurisprudence.  
IV. DECISIVELY RESOLVING THE SPLIT: THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
OVERTURN CARTER AND RECOGNIZE SECTION 1983 CONTRACT CLAUSE 
CLAIMS 
To protect Contract Clause rights, particularly in contracts with 
governmental entities, the Supreme Court should overturn Carter and expressly 
recognize Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. State contract law is an 
insufficient protection for individuals in contract with the state. This is because 
the state can act through legislative powers to abridge the individuals’ rights. 
Due process rights have similarly been held not to be implicated in contractual 
issues.127 Thus, Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims are the only 
appropriate vehicle to check the government’s application of unilateral power 
to its debts and obligations.  
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence supports Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claims. Applying the same analysis that the Court outlined in 
Dennis, where the Court recognized the Commerce Clause as the source of 
individual rights pursuable through Section 1983 actions, the Contract Clause is 
a source of individual rights.128 The plain language of the Contract Clause 
expresses the intention to create an individual right.129 The Contract Clause right 
is not vague or amorphous in the context of public contracts; there are definitive 
 
 125 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 350–51. 
 126 Id. at 351. 
 127 Id. at 348 (“[A] claim for a [due process] violation does not lie where the thrust of 
the plaintiffs’ argument is simply breach of contract.”). 
 128 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448–51 (1991) (applying the Golden State test to 
conclude that the Commerce Clause created an individual right that was enforceable by the 
judiciary, and that plaintiffs like those who brought the claim were the objects of protection 
of the rights created in the Commerce Clause).  
 129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); see also ELY, supra note 24, at 11. 
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obligations, rights, and terms in public contracts with individuals. Yet, because 
at least some courts have interpreted Carter as precluding Contract Clause-
based Section 1983 claims, legal precedence has acted as a barrier to the uniform 
recognition of Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims.130  
The doctrine of stare decisis promotes judicial “obedience to 
precedence.”131 However, stare decisis is not a bar on overturning previous 
decisions.132 The Supreme Court may overturn precedent in consideration of 
factors such as unworkability, age of the precedent, reliance interests at stake, 
and quality of reasoning in the precedential decision.133 Here, these 
considerations counsel overturning Carter to restore the Contract Clause’s place 
within Section 1983 jurisprudence. 
A. Carter Revisited: Poor Reasoning, Unworkability, and Inconsistency 
with Related Decisions 
The circuit courts’ reliance upon Carter demonstrates that Carter has 
become an anathema within Section 1983 jurisprudence—proving that the case 
was ill-decided, effectively unworkable, and out of step with Section 1983 case 
law and Dennis. Taking Kaminski and Crosby together, it is clear that despite 
the Supreme Court’s repeated holdings to the contrary, Carter has taken on a 
legacy that reaches beyond its modest holding. Thus, Carter must be directly 
addressed by the Supreme Court to effectuate the Dennis framework and clearly 
bring the Contract Clause in line with modern Section 1983 jurisprudence. 
1. Carter’s Quality of Reasoning 
Carter has proven ill-reasoned and ill-decided because of the ambiguity the 
Court created with the decision. Carter is a narrow holding, limited to the 
 
 130 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 345–47; Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 641 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
 131 James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare 
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986).  
 132 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)) (“[I]t is common 
wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command.’”) (upholding the core 
holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 133 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (quoting Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009)) (“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in 
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the 
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well 
reasoned.”) (overturning prior decisions that allowed government regulation and suppression 
of political speech based on the speaker’s identity as a corporation); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 
(articulating that the Court weighs “a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations” 
when deciding to overturn precedent, including “practical workability,” reliance on the 
decision, development of related legal principles, and factual changes). 
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pleadings of that case.134 The Dennis dissent recognized that the Contract 
Clause created more of an individual right that could be adjudicated under 
Section 1983 than the Commerce Clause, which the Dennis Court held was a 
valid basis for Section 1983 action.135 The Supreme Court has stated that Carter 
was a limited decision, but the lower courts’ subsequent actions have proven 
that the Carter myth lives on.136  
Crosby and Kaminski demonstrate that lower courts continue to employ a 
broader application of the case that they advocate precludes Contract Clause-
based Section 1983 claims.137 The Fourth Circuit was correct in Crosby that the 
Dennis Court’s discussion of Carter did not overrule that case, yet the Crosby 
court ignored similar guidance regarding Carter from the Supreme Court’s 
Section 1983 jurisprudence.138 Additionally, the Crosby court ignored the 
proposition that the Supreme Court has repeatedly advanced that Carter did not 
even rule on Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims, which, from the 
Dennis Court’s point of view, would negate a need to overturn Carter to bring 
the Contract Clause under Section 1983’s umbrella.139 The Crosby court also 
admitted that Carter did not “substantively explore” Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claims and was of “limited utility in determining whether 
 
 134 See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 n.29 (1979) 
(finding that Carter was a contract claim and the plaintiff in Carter did not plead a Contract 
Clause-based Section 1983 claim); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 
(1939) (observing that Carter was not decided on a pleaded Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claim). 
 135 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 458 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the 
Contracts Clause, an express limitation upon States’ ability to impair the contractual rights 
of citizens, does not secure rights within the meaning of § 1983, it assuredly demands a great 
leap for the majority to conclude that the Commerce Clause secures the rights of persons. 
The Commerce Clause is, if anything, a less obvious source of rights for purposes of § 1983, 
as its text only implies a limitation upon state power.”); see also Schwartz & Pratt, supra 
note 23, at 36 (“After Dennis, which held that the Commerce Clause was enforceable under 
§ 1983, coupled with the fact that the Commerce Clause, at least in some respects, is a power 
allocating provision between national and state government, it would appear that the 
Contract Clause presents a stronger case for [Section 1983] plaintiffs.”). 
 136 Compare Chapman, 441 U.S. at 613 n.29 (“[Carter] held as a matter of pleading that 
the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff’s pleading was in contract and was not to 
redress deprivation of the ‘right secured to him by that clause of the Constitution’ [the 
Contract Clause], to which he had ‘chosen not to resort.’”), and Hague, 307 U.S. at 527 
(same), with Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 2011) (“There is little 
doubt, however, that Carter stands even today for the proposition that an attempted [Section] 
1983 action alleging state impairment of a private contract will not lie.”), and Kaminski, 865 
F.3d at 346 (finding that Carter precludes Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims but 
admitting uncertainty whether or not “Carter retains much precedential force” in the wake 
of Dennis). 
 137 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 349–50 (Moore, J., dissenting); Crosby, 635 F.3d at 641–43. 
 138 See Crosby, 635 F.3d at 639–41 (dismissing the Dennis Court’s discussion of 
Carter).  
 139 See McMahon, supra note 54, at 492–94. 
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Section 1983 might afford a remedy for infringement of federal rights.”140 Yet 
the court applied Carter’s dicta that Section 1983 does not protect Contract 
Clause rights.141  
Although admitting that it was “unclear” that Carter “retain[ed] much 
precedential force,” in Kaminski, the Sixth Circuit analogized the Carter 
decision under Revised Statute 1979 to Section 1983.142 Since Carter noted that 
the Contract Clause only “indirectly and incidentally” conferred rights to 
individuals and that the Contract Clause did not create a private cause of action 
under Revised Statute 1979, the court held that Section 1983 could not sustain 
a Contract Clause-based claim either.143 Again, like the Fourth Circuit in 
Crosby, the court ignored the fundamental characteristic of Carter that the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted—that Carter itself is dicta regarding 
the Contract Clause and Section 1983. The Kaminski court also expressed that, 
at least in part, their decision was motivated by respect for the Supreme Court’s 
sole “prerogative [] to overrule one of its precedents.”144 This suggests that the 
Kaminski court may have been influenced to some degree by the Supreme 
Court’s denial of certiorari in Crosby.145 
This has placed jurisprudence in an odd position: the Supreme Court 
maintains that Carter is of no precedential value for Section 1983 jurisprudence 
because Carter did not rule on Section 1983.146 Yet some lower courts maintain 
that the Supreme Court has not overruled Carter and that Carter stands for the 
proposition that the Contract Clause cannot serve as a basis of a Section 1983 
claim.147 Considerations of poor reasoning in Carter and the subsequent 
confusion and unintended legacy of the case counsel the Court to overturn 
Carter. The Supreme Court must dispel the Carter myth decisively by moving 
past observations that have been dismissed by lower courts as dicta.148 
 
 140 Crosby, 635 F.3d at 641; see also McMahon, supra note 54, at 493 (“In failing to 
address the recent § 1983 jurisprudence, the court also failed to apply the Golden State 
test . . . [which] leans in favor of plaintiffs being able to bring Contracts Clause claims 
pursuant to § 1983.”).  
 141 Crosby, 635 F.3d at 641. 
 142 Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 346–47. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 347 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). 
 145 Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 565 U.S. 823 (2011), denying cert. to Crosby, 635 F.3d 
634 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 146 See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451 n.9 (1991), Chapman v. Houston 
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 n.29 (1979) (noting Carter was a contract claim case 
and not a Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 
U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (same). 
 147 See, e.g., Crosby, 635 F.3d at 640 (“The Supreme Court in Dennis recognized a 
§ 1983 cause of action for the deprivation of rights secured by the Commerce Clause; as 
such, the continuing vitality of Carter and its precedent with respect to the Contracts Clause 
was not before the Dennis Court.”). 
 148 See Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 350 (Moore, J., dissenting); Crosby, 635 F.3d at 641–43; 
cases cited supra note 147. 
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Practically this means, to address the lower courts’ misinterpreted position on 
the holding of Carter, the Supreme Court must address Carter directly by 
overturning the decision. 
2. Carter’s Unworkability 
The misapplication of Carter by the lower courts has led to the case 
becoming unworkable within Section 1983 jurisprudence. The circuit split has 
created an environment where some jurisdictions have recognized Contract 
Clause-based Section 1983 claims and some have not.149 Moreover, at least one 
jurisdiction has moved from recognizing Contract Clause-based Section 1983 
claims to not recognizing them in the time since Dennis was decided.150 Some 
commentators have noted that Section 1983 is the most appropriate legal vehicle 
for challenging the impairment of contracts in the context of public employment 
contracts and benefits, yet the contrasting landscape created by Carter has 
removed the Section 1983 protections from many in a time of fiscal challenges 
when more states and municipalities are seeking to unilaterally change 
contractual commitments to public employees.151 This incongruity means that 
the Contract Clause remains out of step with Section 1983 jurisprudence. The 
circuit split is unsustainable and unworkable. If Section 1983 is to be broadly 
construed and function expansively to protect constitutional rights, the lower 
courts’ application of Carter must be corrected. Thus, considerations of 
unworkability counsel the Supreme Court to overturn Carter. 
3. Reliance Interests in Carter 
The reliance interest in Carter is not so strong that it counsels against 
overturning the case. Certainly, states and state officials have some reliance 
interest in retaining Carter because the case has been interpreted by some 
circuits to preclude Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. However, 
because of the uncertainty of this interpretation across circuits and because a 
Contract Clause-based claim was not pleaded in Carter, the degree of reliance 
cannot be relatively strong. Moreover, state and state officials’ reliance on 
defenses to Section 1983, such as immunity, are not affected by an overturn of 
Carter.152 The overturn of Carter merely formalizes a potential vehicle, outside 
of state law, for individuals to vindicate their constitutional rights.  
 
 149 See cases cited supra note 17. 
 150 See, e.g., Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 351 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Welch v. Brown, 
551 F. App’x 804, 812 (6th Cir. 2014)) (noting that the Sixth Circuit had already implicitly 
held that a Contract Clause violation can give rise to a cause of action under Section 1983). 
 151 See, e.g., McDonell, supra note 57, at 679.  
 152 See Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 23, at 24 & n.166 (noting that qualified immunity 
doctrines apply equally to all types of Section 1983 claims and that questions of qualified 
immunity versus personal liability turn on the “objective legal reasonableness of the action” 
in question). 
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Additionally, individuals whose rights may be violated by the state have a 
strong reliance interest in the consistency of Section 1983 jurisprudence and in 
the contracts for which they bargain. Individuals entering contracts rely on the 
validity and security of the bargain. State employees long promised health 
benefits do not assume that a case from 1885 bars them from practical and 
meaningful recourse when the interests secured in the contract are impaired by 
a state law. Instead, individuals rely upon the rule of law and principles of 
fairness, counting on the judiciary to ensure their contractual rights are protected 
from interested state parties. These citizens also rely upon the Court’s decisions 
that recognize a broad construction of Section 1983 in modern Section 1983 
jurisprudence. Subsequently, consideration of reliance interests does not 
counsel against overturning Carter. 
4. Inconsistency of Carter with Section 1983 Jurisprudence 
Carter is out of step with Section 1983 jurisprudence.153 Application tests 
for whether or not the Contract Clause creates individual rights counsel 
recognition that the Contract Clause creates such rights for the purposes of 
Section 1983.154 Under the Dennis framework, the Contract Clause appears to 
fit as a constitutional right that can form the basis for a Section 1983 Claim.155 
First, the Contract Clause appears at the forefront of the Constitution and 
textually prohibits the states from creating laws that impair contract rights.156 
Because Dennis found that the type of right is not consequential for 
Section 1983 purposes, the distinction between whether the Contract Clause 
protects a property or substantive right becomes unimportant.157 Second, the 
Contract Clause appears to satisfy the Golden State Transit Corp. 
considerations. The Contract Clause clearly binds the states. Individual rights 
asserted under Contract Clause-based claims are inherently specific (i.e., based 
on discrete contractual obligations) and are not too amorphous to be beyond a 
court’s competency. And, individuals are the intended beneficiary of a law that 
 
 153 See cases cited supra, note 51.  
 154 See supra Part III.B; see also Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 23, at 36–37. 
 155 Admittedly, one can argue that the majority’s discussion of the Contract Clause in 
Dennis is dicta because the holding explicitly addressed the Commerce Clause. However, 
the Dennis analysis of rights protected by Section 1983 must guide the discussion of the 
recognition of Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. Additionally, the proposition that 
Carter did not actually address Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims has been oft-
repeated by the Court. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 
613 n.29 (1979) (noting Carter was a contract claim case and not a Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claim); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (same). 
 156 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).  
 157 Even Carter seems to recognize that the Contract Clause created, at a minimum, the 
individual right to pursue a claim if a court denied adjudication opportunity. Carter v. 
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) (“[T]he individual has a right to have a judicial 
determination, declaring the nullity of the attempt to impair its obligation.”). 
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prohibits the making of rules by states that would impair the individuals’ rights 
and obligations. Finally, the Dennis court explicitly rejected that Carter was a 
barrier to Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims, because Carter was a 
narrow decision and a Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claim had not been 
pleaded in that case.158  
Dennis seems to foreclose the application of Carter as a future basis to deny 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. The Dennis Court directly 
addressed the narrowness of Carter’s holding. And the Court seems to offer 
clear guidance that Section 1983 should be broadly, liberally, and beneficently 
construed. If the Commerce Clause has been recognized as a source of 
individual constitutional rights, which has been described as a less obvious 
source of rights than the Contract Clause, then the Contract Clause must also be 
a source of individual rights.159 Having already held that the Commerce Clause 
creates individual rights that can be protected through Section 1983 actions, 
there remains no valid reason to deny the same under the Contract Clause.160 
However, subsequent lower court decisions have demonstrated that Carter 
continues to wield broader influence than the Court counsels.161  
The Supreme Court must render a crystalline holding that clearly positions 
the Contract Clause as an undisputed basis for Section 1983 claims. Indeed, an 
application of the Golden State test to the Contract Clause, the same test that the 
Dennis Court applied to the Commerce Clause, counsels a finding that the 
Contract Clause creates an individual right that should be protected under 
Section 1983.162 Under the Golden State test, a court should consider three 
factors to determine if a federal statute confers a right: (1) whether the statute 
“creates obligations binding on the governmental unit” or just expresses a 
legislative preference for particular treatment; (2) whether the interest that the 
plaintiff asserts is “too vague and amorphous” and beyond the judiciary’s 
 
 158 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451 n.9 (1991). 
 159 Id. at 458 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the Contracts Clause, an express limitation 
upon States’ ability to impair the contractual rights of citizens, does not secure rights within 
the meaning of § 1983, it assuredly demands a great leap for the majority to conclude that 
the Commerce Clause secures the rights of persons. The Commerce Clause is, if anything, a 
less obvious source of rights for purposes of § 1983, as its text only implies a limitation upon 
state power.”); see also Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 23, at 36–37 (discussing the application 
of Dennis to the Contract Clause and noting that in a recent court decision it was assumed 
based on Dennis that Section 1983 already applied to the Contract Clause). 
 160 McDonell, supra note 57, at 679 (“If Section 1983 provides a procedural vehicle for 
claims like excessive force, deliberate indifference, and freedom of speech—all issues that, 
like Contract Clause violations, the Constitution directly addresses—there is no reason to 
deny plaintiffs the ability to bring Contract Clause claims through Section 1983.”); see also 
S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“The 
right of a party not to have a State, or a political subdivision thereof, impair its obligations 
of contract is a right secured by the first article of the United States Constitution. A 
deprivation of that right may therefore give rise to a cause of action under Section 1983.”). 
 161 See supra Part III.C. 
 162 Dennis, 498 U.S. at 448–49. 
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competence to enforce; and (3) whether the statute was “intended to benefit the 
putative plaintiff.”163 Just as the Dennis Court found that these three factors 
counseled for individual rights under the Commerce Clause, consideration of 
the factors and the Contract Clause yields the same result.164  
First, although the state government’s obligation is tempered by its state 
police powers, states are bound by the Contract Clause.165 Second, Contract 
Clause-based claims would not be vague or amorphous because they spring 
from known and quantifiable contractual obligations. Third, the Contract Clause 
specifically protects individuals from state impairment.166 Thus, the plaintiffs 
in Contract Clause actions are the objects of the protections and rights 
contemplated by the Contract Clause. Therefore, the denial of an individual right 
within the Contract Clause that can form the valid basis of a Section 1983 claim 
is inconsistent with the Golden State test and Dennis. Considerations of creating 
a consistent Section 1983 jurisprudence across the nation weigh in favor of 
overturning Carter. 
B. Any Potential Adverse Consequences of Overturning Carter and 
Recognizing Contract Clause-Based Section 1983 Claims Are Mitigated 
by State Police Powers and Immunities 
States and state officials will not face adverse consequences that undermine 
their state police powers or immunities. Overturning Carter and recognizing 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims will not undermine states or 
municipalities. The existing framework for evaluating claims will remain.167 
 
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. at 449–50 (finding that the Commerce Clause created an individual right, the right 
was not too vague and within the judiciary’s purview, and it was intended to protect the types 
of individuals who filed the Section 1983 claim).  
 165 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (explaining that the Dennis majority 
agreed with the proposition that Carter did not foreclose Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claims and Justice Kennedy observed that the Contract Clause was a more 
likely candidate to be a basis for Section 1983 claims than the Commerce Clause); see also 
S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 889 (“Though written in absolute terms, the Supreme Court 
narrowly construes the Contract Clause to ensure that local governments can effectively 
exercise their police powers. State governmental entities ‘must possess broad power to adopt 
general regulatory measures without being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, 
or even destroyed, as a result.’ However, a ‘higher level of scrutiny is required’ when the 
legislative interference involves a public rather than a private obligation.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 166 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”) (emphasis added). Contractual parties are necessarily the 
recipients of the protections of the Contract Clause because they are individuals who are 
impaired by the types of laws prohibited by the contract cause. 
 167 See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1822 (2018) (holding that whether a Contract 
Clause violation has occurred is a question of whether a substantial impairment of a 
contractual right existed, the extent of the impairment, whether the state utilized an 
“‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way to advance ‘a significant and legitimate public 
2019] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 27 
Instead, Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims will merely create a legal 
vehicle through which plaintiffs can protect their rights from infringement and 
abuses of state and local officials. The potential immunities available to states 
and state actors are not affected by this decision and are widely recognized under 
Section 1983 doctrine. Moreover, the power of the state to act to address 
emergencies will not be abrogated. States and municipalities are already bound 
to respect individual Contract Clause rights.168 Indeed, past concerns about 
more forceful interpretations of Contract Clause rights have not come to 
fruition, and despite the stronger Contract Clause standard espoused in United 
States Trust, states and municipalities continue to effectively deal with 
emergencies.169 But a new tool will be available to check these actions and hold 
state and local actions in check if they do impair individual constitutional rights.  
C. Restorative Effects of Overturning Carter 
As discussed in this Part, analysis of Carter indicates that the decision 
should be overturned. While not strictly essential to the recognition of Contract 
Clause-based Section 1983 claims, the overturning of Carter would remove the 
primary source of confusion amongst the circuits and ensure that future court 
analysis of Section 1983 and the Contract Clause is consistent with Dennis, 
which demands a broad interpretation of Section 1983.170 Constitutional 
Contract Clause rights, not just state contract law, lie at the heart of claims 
involving state contracts abridged under governmental authority.171 Thus, the 
Contract Clause rights should be vindicated through Section 1983 claims.  
Further, the protections and relief of Section 1983 will encourage 
individuals to assert their rights by affording damages that include legal fees if 
a cause of action is meritorious.172 By removing a barrier to the vindication of 
Contract Clause rights, more individuals may elect to pursue their rights, thereby 
 
purpose,’” the level of interference with the parties’ reasonable expectations, and whether 
the law in question “prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights”). 
 168 See, e.g., U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (“Both [Home Building 
& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell and El Paso v. Simmons] eschewed a rigid application of the 
Contract Clause to invalidate state legislation. Yet neither indicated that the Contract Clause 
was without meaning in modern constitutional jurisprudence, or that its limitation on state 
power was illusory. Whether or not the protection of contract rights comports with current 
views of wise public policy, the Contract Clause remains a part of our written 
Constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
 169 Id. at 16; Bleznick, supra note 34, at 213 (warning that the United States Trust Co. 
decision could “interfere with effective operation of state and local government”); 
McDonell, supra note 57, at 661 (noting that state and local governments resolved budgetary 
emergencies by eliminating more than $50 billion of pension benefits from 2007 to 2011). 
 170 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443, 445 (1991). 
 171 See McDonell, supra note 57, at 675. 
 172 See McMahon, supra note 54, at 468–69; see also Beermann, supra note 43, at 13–
16 (explaining how legal fees and different remedies are available through Section 1983 
actions, creating a greater incentive for pursuing litigation). 
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holding government entities more accountable for their actions. Recognition of 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims will level the playing field when the 
government is a contractual party.173 Contract Clause-based Section 1983 
claims will likely lead to better government decision making and transparency 
through this accountability.174 Future crises, like the pension collapse in Lincoln 
Park, may be averted because individuals will be empowered to vindicate their 
rights and government officials will be aware that they can be held 
accountable.175 While fiscal emergencies are real and government entities need 
to be empowered to address them, individuals’ rights should not be abridged 
without review or challenge. Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims place 
a check on governmental actions that negate contractual obligations to 
individuals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Carter has had an unintended, yet enduring, chilling effect on recognition 
and protection of individual Contract Clause rights. Observations made in dicta 
in an 1885 decision should not be read to bar Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claims and protections. Section 1983 is the most appropriate 
vehicle to protect individual rights when states unilaterally act to alter contracts 
to which they are a party.176 Remedies under state laws are inadequate and do 
not work to protect the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Contract Clause 
because they do not afford plaintiffs a disinterested forum, are created by the 
states, and discourage plaintiffs from vindicating their rights.177 Moreover, 
denying the advantages of Section 1983 claims disparately impacts minorities 
and the poor, who are less likely to have representation and yet are more 
vulnerable. Extending Section 1983 jurisprudence to formally recognize 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims helps protect the constitutional 
rights of some of the United States’ most vulnerable segments of the 
population.178 
Additionally, the capacity of states and municipalities to effectively deal 
with emergencies and exercise their police powers will not be diminished by 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims. Indeed, states and municipalities 
are already bound by the U.S. Constitution.179 Recognition of Section 1983 
claims merely gives individuals a better means of protecting their rights from 
 
 173 See Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 53.  
 174 Indeed, this is one of the main purposes of Section 1983. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
 175 See McDonell, supra note 57, at 670; see also Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339 
(6th Cir. 2017).  
 176 See McDonell, supra note 57, at 678 (noting the appropriateness and merits of 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims). 
 177 See Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 53; McMahon, supra note 54, at 474–76.  
 178 See Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 53. 
 179 U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977). 
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impairment and checking potential abuses by interested state parties. Existing 
qualified immunity doctrine would not be compromised by recognition of 
Contract Clause-based Section 1983 claims.180 
The Supreme Court should decisively update Section 1983 jurisprudence by 
overturning the Carter decision. The overturn of Carter is necessary because 
lower courts have maintained that Carter stands for the proposition that Contract 
Clause-based Section 1983 claims are barred by precedent. Carter is being 
applied by lower courts in a way that exceeds the purpose of the original 
decision. This has caused Contract Clause causes of action to fall out of line 
with Section 1983 jurisprudence.  
The considerations for overturning precedent counsel Carter’s overturn. 
First, Carter has proven ill-reasoned and ill-decided. Carter was a narrow 
holding, limited to the pleadings of that case. A Contract Clause-based 
Section 1983 claim was not pleaded, and the Court should not have mused on 
the matter. Second, the lower courts have applied Carter’s dicta to Contract 
Clause-based Section 1983 claims and ignored more modern Section 1983 
jurisprudence. This misapplication has resulted in a circuit split that is 
unworkable. The Contract Clause is a valid basis for Section 1983 claims and 
all circuits should apply the clause evenly. Third, reliance interests in 
maintaining Carter counsel overturning the holding. Lower courts do not apply 
the case consistently. States are already bound by the Contract Clause. Fourth, 
Carter has left inconsistency in Section 1983 jurisprudence. Applied to the 
Contract Clause, the Golden State test would indicate that the Contract Clause 
is a source of individual rights. Dennis holds that such rights are within the scope 
of the protections afforded by Section 1983. Thus, it is time for the Supreme 
Court to advance the Contract Clause into modern Section 1983 jurisprudence 




 180 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 10. 
